"Gotta Have Money to Make Money? Bargaining Behavior and Financial Need of Microentrepreneurs" (submitted draft) with Morgan Hardy and Gisella Kagy, forthcoming at American Economic Review: Insights
Bargaining over real prices with microenterprise owners in Ghana, we show that sellers with less per capita household liquidity agree to lower sale prices. This relationship is robust across firms and within firms over time, even after controlling for a plethora of time-varying observables. A computerized bargaining experiment, with randomized initial payout sizes, corroborates the real-bargaining findings. This pattern can be explained by an application of classical bargaining theory that includes endowments and utility functions with decreasing absolute risk aversion. The potential poverty multiplying implications of pricing behavior is a key frontier in understanding barriers to the profitability of microenterprises.
"Digital Addiction" (current draft) with Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, revise and resubmit at American Economic Review
Many have argued that digital technologies such as smartphones and social media are addictive. We develop an economic model of digital addiction and estimate it using a randomized experiment. Temporary incentives to reduce social media use have persistent effects, suggesting social media are habit forming. Allowing people to set limits on their future screen time substantially reduces use, suggesting self-control problems. Additional evidence suggests people are inattentive to habit formation and partially unaware of self-control problems. Looking at these facts through the lens of our model suggests that self-control problems cause 31 percent of social media use.
"Knowledge is (Bargaining) Power – How Consumer Information Affects Pricing Mechanisms" (current draft)
Why do pricing mechanisms co-exist across different markets for the same good or shift over time? This paper explores a fundamental characteristic of the market – buyer composition and belief heterogeneity – to explain whether goods are sold via fixed price or bargaining. Using a bargaining game with second-order uncertainty (a seller does not know what a buyer knows) we show that when buyers have large gains from the transaction and are more heterogeneous in their knowledge of the seller, the seller receives a higher payoff from bargaining than from fixed price. The general solution for the payoff difference between pricing mechanisms depends on the potential gain from the transaction of the seller and the buyer, their patience parameters, and the probability distribution of types. These results explain why different pricing mechanisms co-exist for souvenir markets in developing countries and how the introduction of information technology, such as crowd-sourced review spaces, could affect market structures over time.
"Social Media Content and its Effect on Racial Beliefs, Attitudes and Behavior"
"Discrimination and Media Diversity: Historical Evidence from Radio Stations"
"Commitment, Flexibility, and the Dynamics of Digital Addiction" with Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow